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1 Introduction 
The financing of university research is being scrutinized in Canada and elsewhere as 
governments increasingly demand measures of impact and outcomes from grant awarding 
bodies. One such impact is scientific output: Payne and Siow (2003) as well as Blume-Kohout et 
al. (2009) for instance show that the public funding of university research has a positive effect on 
university scientific production. As Gibbons et al. (1994) suggest, the direction of research has 
migrated from a discipline-based science free of societal needs to a more demand driven science 
that must meet certain objectives. The integration of university research financing with 
government programs aimed at the stimulation of innovation is a relatively recent phenomenon 
(Link and Scott, 2004), but a strategy that is used more and more. This is especially true for 
domains seen as potential growth generators such as aerospace, biotechnology and lately 
nanotechnology. Innovation incentives such as R&D tax credits have been put in place and 
university researchers have benefitted from increased links with industry as a consequence in the 
form of research contracts.  
While public research grants are generally associated with wide scope projects, private contracts 
concentrate on short-term objectives aiming at the production of knowledge that can rapidly be 
used (Goldfarb, 2008). Gulbrandsen and Smeby (2005) find a positive correlation between 
private financing of Norwegian academics and the number of articles they publish. Not only are 
these university researchers more productive, their work is more applied and they collaborate 
more with other academics and with industrial researchers. Van Looy et al. (2004) find similar 
results for contracting activities of researchers. 
 3 
Both publicly funded research and private contracting activities may lead to patenting. The 
literature generally finds that academics who patent produce more scientific publications 
(Breschi et al., 2005; Calderini and Franzoni, 2004; Calderini et al., 2007; Meyer, 2006; Van 
Looy et al., 2006) or that there is no significant effect (Agrawal and Henderson, 2002). Balconi 
and Laboranti (2006) show that researchers that are named inventors on patents owned by firms 
publish more than their colleagues. Although it is not the prime aim of this paper to investigate 
whether patenting is detrimental to scientific publication performance, our model allows us to 
crudely contribute to the debate. 
As funding does not generally come to single researchers but mainly to teams of researchers, the 
other issue that this paper wishes to discuss is the influence of collaboration, measured for 
instance by the position of individual scientists within their co-publication network, on 
individual scientific production. Lee and Bozeman (2005) find that US researchers who 
collaborate generally produce more scientific articles than researchers working alone. Other 
authors find similar results for the UK (Katz and Hicks, 1997) and for Quebec (Landry et al., 
1996). International collaboration increases the potential to publish and to publish in 
international mainstream journals (Barjak and Robinson, 2007; Martín-Sempere et al. 2002). To 
our knowledge, however, very little or no literature examines the influence of individual 
indicators of the position of scientists within the collaboration network on scientific production.  
This article thus integrates the literature on university research funding and on innovation 
networks. Following in the footsteps of the literature, our goal is then to estimate the influence of 
publicly and privately funded research on the production of scientific articles controlling for the 
collaborative network position of the researchers and taking into account the university 
affiliation of the scientists. As such, we aim to answer the following questions: Do better-funded 
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scientists produce more articles? Does contracting and working with industry slow down this 
productivity? Are better-connected scientists more productive? 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: section 2 describes the conceptual framework 
including a brief review of the literature; section 3 presents the data and methodology; section 4 
presents various summary statistics of the data; section 5 presents and analyses the regression 
results; and finally, section 6 concludes. 
2 Conceptual framework 
A great number of scientific publications have been published in nanotechnology during the last 
two decades (see for instance the review by Palmberg et al., 2009, and the country comparison 
studies by Youtie et al., 2008). The observation of this rapid rate of growth in nanotechnology 
since 1990 is further supported by Bonaccorsi and Thoma (2007). It is thus a multidisciplinary 
field that has created a rich pool of publications in all these different disciplines (Porter et al., 
2008 and Mogoutov and Kahane, 2007 have developed specific keyword searches for different 
subdomains). 
As such, nanotechnology has potential applications in a wide range of domains, from 
nanomaterials to nanoelectronics, and from nanofoods to nanobiotechnology. Lipsey et al. (2005) 
and Youtie et al. (2008) indeed suggest that nanotechnology may be the next general purpose 
technology, i.e. the next engine of growth of the 21st century.  
As an emerging technology, nanotechnology innovation goes through different phases of 
development. For the first phase, the patience required and the uncertainties linked to the 
innovation process do not suit all types of fund providers, hence the importance of public 
research in these domains. Collaboration with university research centers contribute to reducing 
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the uncertainties of innovation activities and thus the risks related to R&D projects. Public 
financing of research thus facilitates the production of knowledge and constitutes one of the key 
elements of the development of high-tech innovation. Research funding therefore enhances the 
success of innovation.  
Zucker et al. (2007) insist on the necessity of collaboration between institutions to foster 
information exchange. Multi-project research centers force researchers and their universities to 
collaborate more efficiently using the diversity of resources available. Collaboration can indeed 
become a powerful lever to raise funds (Daniel et al., 2003), and scientific collaboration and 
research funding are consequently intrinsically intertwined. 
Nanotechnology research requires an important infrastructure in order to realize the projects that 
lead to the development of new products or processes (Robinson et al., 2007), even more so than 
for biotechnology. Infrastructure investment not only consists of the acquisition of complex 
machines and instruments but also of the funds necessary for their operation and maintenance 
that requires specialized skilled personnel and logistics management to optimize access to this 
infrastructure. The creation of such a technological platform hence requires long-term investment 
in order to play its role as a space that fosters the emergence and fulfillment of new 
opportunities. Although universities and their affiliated research centers are the natural 
candidates for the localization of such technological platforms, because their main goal is often 
to generate knowledge aimed at yielding technological innovation, the private sector should play 
an important role in their management and utilization.  
Intuitively, most university research projects are financed from public funds (Hagedoorn et al., 
2000). Hart (2001) recognizes that public financing is increasingly targeted towards the 
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development of innovation according to specific political guidelines; the main objective of these 
political guidelines being the creation and maintenance of competence centers within the 
university network. This network, composed of universities and their affiliated research centers, 
is an integral part of the national system of innovation (Hall et al., 2003). Within the national 
system of innovation, universities and their affiliated research centers play a crucial role in the 
innovation value chain that leads to economic growth (Link and Scott, 2004; Zucker et al., 
2002). For instance, public research infrastructure generates technological knowledge that is 
transferred via pure externalities, entrepreneurship or contracts (Zucker et al., 1998). University 
researchers facilitate knowledge transfer between research laboratories and firms (Audretsch and 
Stephan, 1996). All these beneficial effects have a common origin: money and to a certain 
extent, collaborative work. 
Payne and Siow (2003) as well as Blume-Kohout et al. (2009) suggest that the augmentation in 
public financing that university science research has experienced recently has had a tremendous 
effect on scientific output. Furthermore, public funding for specific projects can be perceived as 
a signal of quality not only for the funded researchers, but also for their university. Adams et al. 
(2005) show that top universities and departments that have earned awards, have larger teams 
(with an increased scientific division of labor at the international level) and have more 
government funding.  
The granting of research money further act as a signal that attracts additional funding in 
subsequent years. Using a static model, Arora et al. (1998) show that the publication track record 
of researchers has an influence on future grants and consequently on future publication levels as 
well. Zucker et al. (2007) generally show the major impact that research financing has both on 
the publication of scientific articles and on patent production. Specifically, Payne and Siow 
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(2003) show that three years after receiving an instrumentation grant of one million dollars, 
between 8 and 11 new articles are generally published annually. Jacob and Lefgren (2007) find 
that specific grants contribute to adding one additional publication within the five years 
subsequent to the attribution of the grant. 
Proposition 1: Academics that obtain greater amounts of public funding generate a larger 
number of articles. 
In a field as close to its science base as nanotechnology, public financing should be seen as 
complementary to private contracts. Private funding has dramatically increased since 1985 
(Cohen et al., 2002) and so did university-industry research centers. University-industry research 
relations increase contact with scientists but lower communication between scientists and 
possibly shield their work from potentials future partners (Welsh et al., 2008). As a consequence, 
a greater proportion of contracts could have a negative effect on a scientist’s future scientific 
production. This could be due to the different reward process used in industrial and academic 
milieus (Owen-Smith et al., 2001), or to the short-termism associated with private contracts 
(Goldfarb, 2008). Despite these findings, Blumenthal et al. (1996), Gulbandsen and Smeby 
(2005) as well as Van Looy et al. (2004) find that contracts have a positive effect on knowledge 
production. In fact, an overwhelming body of evidence finds a positive relationship between 
‘academic enterprise’ and scientific performance (see the excellent review of Larsen, 2011 for a 
complete survey). 
Proposition 2: Receiving greater amounts of research funds from contracts is beneficial to the 
scientific productivity of an academic. 
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Knowledge used within these research institutions, is often appropriated from the publications 
generated by the research community (Dasgupta and David, 1984). Knowledge generated 
(output) by some scientists thus becomes knowledge appropriated (input) by other scientists. The 
notion of knowledge networks is clearly appropriate to the analysis of such a positive feedback 
system or virtuous circle. Their importance both in terms of economic growth and codified 
knowledge diffusion has been demonstrated (Aharonson et al., 2004), and a number of authors 
use social network analysis and network indicators emanating from graph theory to investigate 
the characteristics and degree of interrelatedness of groups of researchers (Bonaccorsi and 
Thoma, 2007; Cantner and Graf, 2006). Our research follows their lead and integrates social 
network analysis indicators of collaboration to the impact analysis. 
Nanotechnology university scientists do not generally work in isolation but in increasingly large 
multidisciplinary research groups. Research funding is therefore rarely attributed to a single 
scientist, but much more commonly to a research team, especially when the amounts are rather 
large. The principle of collective invention, as proposed by Allen (1983), characterized by the 
free circulation of knowledge among socially connected agents, is very much a reality in this 
field. Lamoreaux and Sokoloff (1997), Dahl and Pedersen (2004), von Hippel (1987) and 
Schrader (1991) provide various examples of collective invention.  
Theoretical simulation studies have shown that knowledge diffusion is more efficient through 
clustered networks (Cowan and Jonard, 2003), and relatively cliquish networks (Cowan and 
Jonard, 2004). The theoretical study of Cowan et al. (2004) shows that network structure 
significantly influences the long-term production of knowledge. Our paper examines these issues 
from an empirical point of view. In his empirical study, Newman (2001b) shows that the 
probability of a particular scientist acquiring new collaborators increases with the number of his 
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past collaborators, and that the probability of a pair of scientists collaborating increases with the 
number of other collaborators they have in common (the creation of a clique). A number of 
scholars claim that collaboration persistency through time also positively influences knowledge 
productivity. For instance, Cowan et al. (2004) claim that previous collaborations increase the 
probability of a successful collaboration in the future. Furthermore, Fleming et al. (2006) argue 
that an inventor’s past collaboration network will strongly influence subsequent productivity. 
Proposition 3: Better-positioned scientists with the co-publication network are generally more 
productive. 
Newman (2001a) observed that for most scientists, the path linking them to other scientists goes 
through a relatively small number of very central individuals. These central individuals generally 
receive the most research funding. The question therefore is whether the position and funding of 
these individuals influence their knowledge production. These are the issues that we wish to 
address in this paper. 
3 Data and methodology 
3.1 Data and variables 
Canada does not escape the tendencies described in the previous section in terms of increased 
funding, publishing and patenting of nanotechnology research. According to Hu et al. 
(forthcoming), Canada occupies the 5th rank in 2005-2009 with 8% of the world nanotechnology 
publications, an improvement from the 11th rank for the 1998-2002 period (equivalent to 2% of 
the world’s nanotechnology publications). 
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The latter corresponds to a period where nanotechnology public funding was considerably 
fragmented (Rosei, 2008). In the subsequent years, the Natural Sciences and Engineering 
Research Council of Canada (NSERC) launched the five-year 5M$ ‘Nano Innovation Platform’ 
which distributed its first research grants in 2003, while at the same time, the Canadian Institutes 
of Health Research (CIHR) invested roughly the same amount on regenerative medicine and 
nanomedicine. These initiatives obviously had an impact in raising the number of Canadian 
nanotechnology publications, but also of the number of patents (Dang et al., 2010), although the 
proportion of the world’s patents that are attributed to Canada has dropped, mainly because of 
the rapid rise of China. It is probably too soon however to be able to really see the impact of this 
increased funding on patented innovation. 
This research requires the integration of three data sources on funding, publishing and patenting: 
Elsevier’s Scopus, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and the University 
Research Information System (Système d’information sur la recherche universitaire or SIRU) of 
the Quebec Ministry of Education, Leisure and Sports. Scopus provides the necessary data on 
nanotechnology scientific articles (date of publication, co-authors and their affiliations), while 
the USPTO provides the name and address of all inventors and patent assignees. SIRU contains 
the grants and contracts during the period 1985-2005 of all Quebec university scientists. The data 
for each scientist provides their affiliation as well as the yearly amount received from each grant 
or contract registered with the university1.  
                                                
1 A number of Quebec scientists own small companies through which they perform consultative work. We have no 
means by which to estimate the breadth of such a practice but estimate it to be relatively small compared to the bulk 
of the funding received through the official channels, because of the very nature of nanotechnology research. 
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Using a keyword search similar to that of Porter et al. (2008), we have extracted all scientific 
articles and patents relating to nanotechnology for which at least one Canadian-affiliated scientist 
contributed for the period 1985-2005. This yields 4 883 patents that have been produced by 
4 996 inventors and 23 250 articles authored by 24 083 scientists from which the co-publication 
networks will be characterized. Restricting the resulting sample to 1996-2005, because there has 
been a substantial change in the quality of Scopus before and after 1996, yields 17 803 articles. 
Merging the three databases required the careful examination of the surnames and first names (in 
SIRU) or initials (in Scopus and the USPTO) of scientists and their affiliations (or addresses) in 
all three databases. The intersection of the three databases results in the scientific production and 
financing of all Quebec nanotechnology academics. This exercise further reduces scientific 
output to 3 724 publications authored by 1 116 Quebec scientists and 566 patents involving 325 
Quebec inventors. Finally, to ensure that these scientists are truly involved in nanotechnology, 
we select only those for which we can find at least 5 publications throughout the 21 years 
examined, hence eliminating the ‘occasional’ nanotechnology scientists. The resulting panel 
database contains 5 724 observations of 907 Quebec academics.  
Using the social network analysis software Pajek, we then characterize the network of co-authors 
using co-publication links between scientists from the articles extracted. In these networks, the 
vertices are the co-authors or scientists and the edges between the vertices represent the co-
authorship links of each article. In order to follow the evolution of collaboration over the years, 
we have created sub-networks using the co-publication links over periods of three and five years. 
An analysis of these sub-networks enabled us to describe their structural properties and to 
explore the collaborative behavior of nanotechnology scientists in Quebec. 
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An important consideration relates to the historical structure or time period of both the funding 
and collaboration measures. Public grants are generally awarded for a number of years. For 
example, Tier I Canada research chairs are generally awarded for periods of seven years (five 
years for Tier II chairs). Ordinary research grants vary from three to five years. Other major 
collaborative grants cover seven years of funding while smaller initiatives can be awarded for 
periods as short as one year. In the literature, the time period of collaborative networks vary from 
one study to the next. For instance, Schilling and Phelps (2007) use three-year windows for their 
firm collaborative networks. Gulati and Gargiulo (1999) prefer five-year windows and so does 
Stuart (2000). As a consequence, during the course of our analysis, three- and five-year sub-
networks have been considered and the most robust results are reported in this paper, i.e., those 
for three-year sub-networks. 
We seek to assess the direct impact of funding, i.e. the total amounts of grants and contracts on 
the number of articles published in a given year. Because of the reasons mentioned above, the 
average amount of funding over three and five years were included in our models and the three 
year averages were found to be the best suited to our data: [AveGrant3] and [AveCont3] 
represent respectively the average amount of grants and contracts received by an academic 
during the past three years. To distinguish between operating cost funds and those dedicated to 
infrastructure, we used the average amount of operating grants over three years [AveGrantO3] 
and the average amount of infrastructure grants over three years [AveGrantI3]2.  
                                                
2 Negligible amounts of contracts for infrastructure acquisition are present in the database. As consequence, we do 
not distinguish between the infrastructure contracts and operating cost contracts. 
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Our measures of network attributes focus on a scientist’s position within the network: 
betweenness centrality and individual cliquishness. Betweenness centrality of a vertex (scientist) 
refers to the capacity of a scientist to link two other scientists from the same three-year sub-
network through the smallest number of intermediaries [Btwness3]. If a greater proportion of the 
shortest paths between all other vertices ‘goes through’ a particular vertex, this vertex has a 
higher betweenness centrality and her role as an intermediary is more important. Cliquishness of 
a vertex is measured by the egocentric density of a vertex which is defined as the fraction of all 
pairs of the immediate neighbors of a vertex that are also directly connected to each other. The 
cliquishness of an individual in a three-year subnetwork [Cliqness3] basically measures the 
likelihood that two vertices that are connected to a specific third vertex are also connected to one 
another, hence forming a clique. 
To investigate whether the relationship between patents and papers is one of reinforcement (or 
complementary, as Stephan et al., 2007 coined it) or of substitution (Klitkou and Gulbrandsen, 
2010), we include the number of patents filed in the past three years [nbPatent3]. 
Furthermore, we add the time elapsed between the start of the nanotechnology activities of an 
academic in a given year to create a proxy for the nanotechnology ‘career’ age or experience of 
the researcher [Age]. This control variable accounts for the fact that generally, older scientists are 
more productive (Merton, 1973; Cole and Cole, 1973; Wray 2003 et 2004; Kyvik et Olsen, 
2008). Other scholars however argue that the most extraordinary discoveries are made by 
researchers before their 40th birthday (Adams, 1946; Zuckerman, 1977; Stern, 1978; Gieryn, 
1981).  
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Finally, to take into consideration university variations that would not otherwise be accounted 
for, we include university dummy variables [dUniv] for the Quebec universities: McGill 
University [dUMcGill], University of Montreal including Ecole Polytechnique of Montreal 
[dUMontrealG], Concordia University [dUConcordia], all the constituents of University of 
Quebec [dUQG], as well as University of Sherbrooke and Bishop University together as they are 
both located near Sherbrooke city [dSherbrookeG].  
3.2 Model specification 
As mentioned above, the goal of the project consists in determining whether researchers with a 
greater amount of grants or contracts and in better network positions generate more innovation in 
the form of scientific production. Our dependent variable is therefore the number of articles 
published in a given year [nbArticle]. Because the dependent variable is a count measure, we use 
negative binomial regressions specific to panel data to estimate the number of articles published 
by an individual in a given year. Appendix A provides details of the models used in this paper. 
The model to be estimated can thus be expressed in reduced form as: 
nbArticleit = f
AveGrant3it!1,AveCont3it!1,nbPatent3it!1,
Btwness3t!2,Cliqness3t!2,Ageit,dUnivi,dTt
"
#$
%
&'
 Eq. (1) 
A problem then arises because the probability of obtaining grants depends on past publications, 
which also depend on the grants available prior to publication. Because of the high correlation 
between various lags of the same variables, this problem is apparent to that of simultaneity, 
which is a common cause of endogeneity. A second cause of endogeneity is related to 
unobserved heterogeneity, which in our case would be the intrinsic quality of the researchers. 
Despite our efforts to collect the most complete and accurate data to account for the majority of 
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factors that contribute to explaining the variation in the number of publications, omitted variables 
(such as mobility of researchers between institutions) and measurement error are inevitably 
present in the data at our disposal. The most important source of endogeneity however, and the 
one for which we will try to correct, is simultaneity. In the absence of endogeneity, the negative 
binomial regression model presented in Eq. (1) would be sufficient. To correct the model for 
endogeneity, we use the Two-Stage Residual Inclusion (2SRI) method proposed by Terza et al. 
(2008). 
The basic idea is to estimate the endogenous variable, in our case the average amount of grants 
received over three years [AveGrant3], with an ordinary least squares regression on a number of 
exogenous variables or instruments. The residue of this regression is then computed and used as 
an explanatory variable in the model of interest. Bíró (2009) uses this particular method with a 
negative binomial regression for the second stage regression. Details of the methodology are 
provided in Appendix A. 
Although we have not yet found in the literature an application of the 2SRI model using panel 
data, we will estimate the 2SRI model considering the overall error term as equivalent to the 
error term of the model utilized by Terza et al. (2008). As robustness checks we will estimate 
non-panel 2SRI regressions, i.e. cross-section regressions with repeated measures to account for 
the non-independence of the same individual through time. We will therefore show the results 
corresponding to the 2SRI model with and without the panel data representation, taking into 
account the repeated measurements of individuals through time. The STATA procedure xtnbreg 
(second stage negative binomial regression) and xtreg (first stage OLS regression) will be used 
for the panel regressions, and the procedures nbreg (second stage negative binomial regression) 
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and reg (first stage OLS regression) will be used with the vce(cluster) option to account for the 
non-independence of observations regarding the same individuals. 
To correct for endogeneity, we include a number of variables that contribute to explaining the 
unobserved capabilities of a researcher to publish and his ability to raise public funds from 
grants. As grants are generally given on the basis of the past publication record of a scientist, the 
first instrument is the average yearly publication rate of each scientist in the three years prior to 
the grant [AveArticle3]. The second indicator is an ordered measure of the academic prestige 
linked to various research chairs. If an academic never had a chair in the period examined, the 
variable [codeChair] takes the value 0. If she has had an industrial chair at some point in her 
career, the variable takes the value 1, for NSERC or CIHR chairs, the variable takes the value 2, 
and finally, for Canada research chairs, the variable takes the value 3. Because we are interested 
in measuring the potential quality of academics, if an individual eventually reaches the top level 
of our chair classification, she will be attributed the top value for the entire period. Finally, the 
third attribute relates to the university to which an academic is affiliated. This accounts for the 
reputation of the establishment, the attraction power it has on different quality of individual 
researchers, and so on. This is accounted for by the average amount of grants raised by scientists 
per university in the past three years [AveGrant3U]. 
The regressions (first and second stages) to be estimated can therefore be expressed as: 
AveGrant3it!1 = f
AveArticle3it!2,codeChairi,AveGrant3Ut!1,AveCont3it!1,
nbPatent3it!1,Btwness3it!1,Cliqness3it!1,Ageit,dUnivi,dTt
"
#$
%
&'
 Eq. (2) 
nbArticleit = f
AveGrant3it!1,AveCont3it!1,nbPatent3it!1,Btwness3it!1,
Cliqness3it!1,Ageit,dUnivi,dTt, residual1st
"
#$
%
&'
 Eq. (3) 
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where Eq. (2) corresponds to Eq. (A.1) in appendix A and Eq. (2) corresponds to Eq. (A.2), and 
residual1st is the residual from Eq. (2). The model also includes year dummy variables [dT] to 
account for any yearly differences that would not be accounted for by the explanatory variables. 
4 Descriptive statistics 
Before turning to the regression results, let us first briefly describe some of the explanatory 
variables (which are further described in appendix B at the end of the paper). Fig. 1 presents the 
average number of articles per academic, our dependent variable, for each of the universities 
examined. McGill University generally dominates, followed by Laval University and the 
University of Montreal in second and third places. Concordia University rises sharply towards 
the end of the sample, despite a declining average amount of public funds received (Fig. 2).  
Insert Fig. 1 approximately here 
Insert Fig. 2 approximately here 
Examining the average amount of research funds granted to individual researchers (Fig. 2) shows 
that until the turn of the century, the differences between the amounts received by scientists from 
different universities is not as pronounced as in the latter part of the sample. The peaks obtained 
by University of Montreal in 2000 and 2003, as well as by Laval University in 2002 and by 
McGill University in 2004 are mainly due to large infrastructure grants obtained by their 
scientists. 
With the recruitment of new professors and the use of the Canadian Foundation for Innovation 
(CFI), these universities have built a considerable research infrastructure. The recent increase in 
scientific production (though not apparent from the graphs which show averages per scientist) is 
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probably attributable to this investment. Scientists from Concordia, Sherbrooke and Quebec 
universities receive less funds per year than their colleagues of McGill, Montreal and Laval 
universities. Fig. 3 indicates that researchers from the University of Montreal have on average 
received almost double the industrial contracts of McGill University. This would tend to suggest 
more applied work for/with industry. In that game, Laval University wins hands down with the 
highest proportion of contracts among all Quebec universities.  
Turning now to the network measures, we find that both betweenness centrality and cliquishness 
have decreased slightly over the years (see Fig. 4) but that the former has stabilized since the turn 
of the century. As more scientists from a number of different disciplines turn their attention to 
nanotechnology, it is to be expected that the betweenness centrality of individuals will decrease 
over time. This phenomenon is also observed for nanotechnology patents over the same period 
by Beaudry and Schiffauerova (2011). The authors link this diminution over time to the 
increased fragmentation of the field due to its development in a vast array of domains of 
application. 
Insert Fig. 4 approximately here 
Because we used the variable [Age] as is a proxy for the experience gained in nanotechnology by 
the researcher over time, we examine the interaction of this variable with the number of articles 
and the number of patents (Fig. 5). As mentioned by Lee and Bozeman (2005) and Lehman 
(1953), research productivity grows with the age of the scientist and peaks at a certain period. 
The latter vary with the discipline and whether the research is fundamental or more technology-
oriented. In our case, the age of the scientific production continues to increase with age, while 
 19 
patenting tends to follow an inverted U-shaped curve. Both curves imply non-linear effects, 
which will be taken into consideration in the regressions that follow.  
Insert Fig. 5 approximately here 
5 Results 
The regressions estimate the factors that influence researcher productivity measured by the 
number of articles (the results are shown in Table 1). Our analysis has considered a lag structure 
of one-, two- and three-year lags for most variables of the model, similar to what Schilling and 
Phelps (2007) have used in their model. We have tested all combinations of lags and the most 
robust results combine one- and two-year lags (one-year lag was found to be most appropriate 
for public grants and contracts while two-year lags were more robust for the network variables). 
We also included interaction effects between variables, and a quadratic term for others to 
account for non-linear effects. 
Table 1 presents the results of 10 regression models, using a number of variables to represent 
grants, contracts and network position indicators. The first two models do not consider the 
endogeneity; they estimate Eq. (1). Model (1) uses a panel data negative binomial regression 
model while model (2) estimates a cross-section negative binomial model (i.e. without the panel 
data representation) using a clustering method to include repeated observations of the same 
scientist over the years. Models (3) to (8) are the second stage regressions, Eq. (3), of the 2SRI 
method with a panel data negative binomial regression. We tested different sets of variables over 
a hierarchical progression for the inclusion of the variables. The last two models, (9) and (10), 
estimate the second stage regression of the 2SRI cross-section negative binomial model (without 
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the panel data structure) using the same clustering method. Table C.1 in the appendix presents 
the related results for the first stage regressions, Eq. (2), of the 2SRI models. 
Insert Table 1 approximately here 
Insert Table 2 approximately here 
Let us now take each variable in turn and analyze its influence on scientific production. First, the 
influence of the average amount of grants over three years [AveGrant3] on the number of articles 
published follows a quadratic convex function (J-shaped), which implies that the productivity of 
the researcher increases exponentially (the linear effect is not significantly different from 0). This 
indicates that larger grants, or more funding, increase the number of published articles, a result in 
accordance with Arora et al. (1998) and Zucker et al. (1997). The results are similar if we 
distinguish operating cost grants [AveGrantO3] and infrastructure grants [AveGrantI3] in Table 
2. This last variable only appears in the first stage regression as it is not correlated with the 
number of articles, nor was it significant in the second stage regression (this contrasts with Payne 
and Siow, 2003 who find a direct effect of infrastructure grants on scientific output). The average 
amount of infrastructure grants is therefore added as an instrument in the first stage regressions 
and contributes to explaining the average amount of operating cost grants received by an 
academic. Its influence on the amount of operating cost grants vary linearly (see Table C.2 in the 
appendix). As with the average amount of public funds, the average amount of operating cost 
grants raised by a scientist has a positive effect on the productivity of the researcher. Operating 
cost grants are destined for the direct resources working on the research (students, laboratory 
assistant, research assistant, equipment maintenance, etc.), which are important for the discovery 
of any knowledge worth publishing. Through the different models, we can say that the simple 
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(linear) effect of the total amount is positive and significant, but that its effect is closer to 
exponential as shown by the coefficient of the quadratic effect introduced. 
Turning now to our instruments to correct for potential endogeneity of the average amount of 
grants received, in Eq. (2), we generally find them to have a positive and significant effect. These 
results are presented in Table C.1 in the appendix (Table C.2 presents the corresponding results 
for the distinction between operating cost and infrastructure grants). A greater yearly average of 
publications in the past three years has the expected positive influence on the likelihood of 
raising more public research funds, and so does the chair ‘prestige’ status. These findings 
obviously follow the general intuition and more specifically support those of Arora et al. (1998). 
The average amount of research funds raised by other university colleagues of the same 
institution also contributes to explaining our endogenous variable. In these regressions, we also 
find that researchers that raise more funds from private contracts also raise more funds from 
public sources.  
Generally, private funds are destined for specific projects in relation to an industrial problem. 
This work is considered ‘protected’ for the industry as it may contain confidential content. That’s 
why companies set restrictions for the research results that would most of the time prevent a 
scientist from publishing articles related to the output of his industry collaboration. The output of 
privately funded research tends to appear more as patents, because it guarantees ownership of the 
intellectual property to the investors. The total amount of contracts does not however appear to 
have a significant effect (neither negative, nor positive) on the number of publications, only in 
one of the cross-section (regression 9) is it negative and significant. This finding contradicts the 
literature that suggests a reinforcing effect of private funds on research productivity 
(Gulbrandsen and Smeby, 2005; Van Looy et al., 2004), and the literature suggesting a 
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substitution effect (anticipated for instance by Welsh et al., 2008 and Blumenthal et al., 1996). 
Our findings may be explained by the fact that nanotechnology is still relatively far from the 
market. Because the field is quite young, private contracts may result in scientific articles, but 
they may also yield patents in the fields closer to technology applications (the evolution from 
microelectronics to nanoelectronics for example).  
For this reason, we have tested whether there was a moderating effect between patents and 
private contracts, but to no avail, the resulting interactive variable was never significant. 
Although we find no evidence of impact on scientific production, the very nature of 
nanotechnology calls for this closeness between industry and universities. Canada has invested 
vast amounts on infrastructure and laboratory equipment, mostly from public sources. These 
expensive resources (both in infrastructure and in the skilled labor necessary for its operation) 
would be difficult to finance privately and hence contribute to attracting industries (Robinson et 
al., 2007 for instance examine cluster formation enabled by these infrastructures or platforms). 
The interaction between publicly funded research infrastructure and private contracts is therefore 
important to examine. 
Both variables [AveGrantI3 and AveCont3] in Table C.1 and Table C.2 have a positive and 
significant influence on the average amount of public grants raised by a scientist. In fact, having 
the laboratory machinery and the equipment necessary for high technology research is a strong 
argument to attract the grants to operate them. Similarly, the average amount of contract seems 
to attract more operating cost funds to a researcher. The positive and significant effect of the 
contract variable suggests a Matthew effect (money attracts more money) that is very much 
verified in our data set (Merton, 1968). Arora et al. (1998), suggest that funding is more likely to 
be directed towards scientists with an established tracked record of successes, and we would add 
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a tracked record that was the result of more funding. The interaction between the two variables, 
however, has a negative and significant effect, implying that the infrastructure used in 
conjunction with private firms reduces the need to obtain public funding. In regards to the use of 
infrastructure, public and private funds therefore appear to be substitutes.  
Industrial interests or potential commercialization does nevertheless have an influence as the 
number of patents has an inverted-U relationship with the number of articles. The maximum of 
the resulting curve corresponds roughly to 30 patents over three years. As a consequence, before 
that point, the first patents tend to reinforce an individual’s scientific production and strengthen 
the reputation of the researcher. Beyond that point, however, contributing to more patents 
implies a declining number of articles published, ceteris paribus. Hence patents are detrimental 
to scientific productivity only beyond a relatively large amount of patent applications filed over a 
period of three years. Once a rather large number of patent applications have been made, 
scientists tend to prioritize applied work and focus on patenting; it clearly becomes a career 
choice, which may then be more profitable.  
Regarding the influence of collaboration, we find that betweenness centrality [Btwness3] has a 
positive and significant effect on the number of articles. This confirms our expectation that a 
researcher with a more central position in the co-publication network, i.e. a more influential 
intermediary, generally publishes more articles. In addition, past individual cliquishness 
[cliqness3] tends to have a negative effect on scientific productivity. Once we account for 
nonlinearities of this variable, we find what appears like the left-hand branch of an inverted-U 
relationship with the number of published articles, i.e. scientific productivity exhibits 
diminishing returns to increased cliquishness. A higher cliquishness value implies that the 
collaborators of an academic are more likely to be collaborators as well, i.e. to form a clique. Our 
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results would tend to suggest that if a researcher maintains some degree of segregation between 
the groups with whom he collaborates, which would yield a lower cliquishness value, his 
probability of publishing is greater if his ‘clique’ is slightly more integrated. Further along the 
curve of increased cliquishness, however, the returns of a greater integration of the clique are 
much smaller. In some fields, large multidisciplinary teams are necessary and, as a consequence 
of the integration of knowledge from various sources, publication is slightly slower as various 
disciplines adjust to each other. When a field is in its infancy, as nanotechnology clearly is, the 
skills and knowledge necessary for research probably go beyond the restricted circle of a 
scientist’s direct collaborators, especially when the resulting technology has a vast array of 
potential applications. This would explain, to some extent, why working in increasingly cliquish 
nanotechnology networks do not tend to augment the productivity of each scientist as much as 
when there is a rather fragmented clique around a scientist. This would tend to support an 
extension to scientific productivity of Cowan and Jonard’s (2004) argument that knowledge 
diffusion is more efficient in ‘relatively’ cliquish networks, i.e. not too cliquish but cliquish 
enough.  
Examining closely regressions (3), (4) and (5) shows that betweenness centrality interacts with 
other variables in our models and moderates their influence on the dependent variable, 
particularly patenting and cliquishness. To counter this intrinsic relation of betweenness 
centrality with these variables, we have introduced interactive variables with cliquishness, the 
average amount of contracts and the number of patents3. Interacting betweenness centrality with 
cliquishness decreases the diminishing returns impact of the latter. In contrast, interacting 
                                                
3 Other interactions have been tested, but were non significant. Only those presented in Table 1 are significant and 
are worth including in the models. 
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betweenness centrality with the total number of patents over three years contributes to 
dampening the inverted-U shaped effect of patenting on scientific productivity. 
Our last explanatory variable, the nanotechnology ‘career’ age of a scientist, generally has a 
positive effect on scientific productivity, in line with Fig. 5. When we add a quadratic term, the 
curvature of the relationship appears. Around 16 years after starting nanotechnology work, 
scientific production starts to decline. It would therefore appear that it is the mid-career scientists 
that have the highest scientific production, a result in line with that of Cole (1979), Wray (2003 
and 2004) as well as Kyvik and Olsen (2008). 
A recent debate (Wells, 2009) on university research funding in Canada saw the ‘big 5’ 
universities (University of British Columbia, University of Alberta, University of Toronto, 
University of Montreal and McGill University) argue that they should receive all (or the bulk of) 
the research funding, concentrate only on graduate training and leave undergraduate teaching to 
the other Canadian universities. The argument put forward in Wells’ (2009) article by the five 
top university presidents is that they should be allowed to “pursue world-class scientific research 
and train the most capable graduate students”. 
Although this proposal raised a wall of protestation in Canada, the question as to where does 
research funding yields the highest scientific productivity deserves an answer. In this article, we 
focus on the Quebec universities and compare the publication results obtained by two of the ‘big 
5’ (University of Montreal and McGill University) as a result of the research funding received. 
From the analysis of the university dummy variables included in the regressions, we cannot say 
that our results support their claim, certainly not in terms of scientific production. The omitted 
dummy variable is for McGill University, to which the results should be compared. All 
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university dummy variables are significantly different from McGill University with the 
exception of Concordia University, which is sometimes weakly significant. In the field of 
nanotechnology, the University of Montreal does not appear to deserve its ‘title’: Being located 
at the University of Montreal has no significantly different effect than being located at Laval 
University (in Quebec city). We can say that there is no evidence so far that researchers from the 
two ‘best’ universities in Quebec publish ‘more’ than their colleagues in other universities in the 
province. The ‘publish or perish game’ is similar for all universities and researchers conform to 
it.  
6 Discussion and conclusion 
At the beginning of this paper, we set out to investigate whether the funding and organization 
(read collaboration or co-authorship) of research has an impact on the output from this research. 
To that effect, we suggested three propositions, two on funding and one on the individual 
network position of an academic. 
To the first part of the question, on the funding, the answer is overwhelmingly ‘yes there is an 
impact’, but there are subtleties. While more public research funds undoubtedly lead to more 
scientific articles, hence supporting proposition 1 and the work of other scholars (for instance 
Arora et al., 1998, Zucker et al. 2007), the relationship between private funds and scientific 
production is inexistent (in contrast with Van Looy et al., 2004), hence rejecting proposition 2. 
Contracts, which are generally associated with more applied research, do not have the commonly 
found reinforcing impact on the scientific production in nanotechnology. Public policy should 
not therefore consider industrial contracting as a threat to the creation of a collective knowledge 
base, not at the current level of industry involvement in any case.  
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Since the amount of private research funds at the disposal of researchers does not yield a 
convincing story, the number of patents to which a researcher has contributed may play a more 
fundamental role. We indeed find that it is not so much the fact that academics collaborate with 
firms that affects their publishing record, it is too much patenting. And when we mean too much, 
we imply more than 20 to 40 patents over a period of three years, which clearly is a career 
choice. Below that extraordinary contribution to technology, we clearly find a reinforcement 
effect between patenting and publishing, hence supporting the findings of a number of scholars 
(Breschi et al., 2005; Calderini and Franzoni, 2004; Calderini et al., 2007; Meyer, 2006; Van 
Looy et al., 2006). The implication in terms of public policy would be to encourage, or at least 
not discourage, scientists to bring their research closer to the market as the protection of 
intellectual property does have a positive impact on their scientific production when performed 
within reasonable bounds, bearing in mind that too much of a good thing can be detrimental to 
scientific production.  
In a field such as nanotechnology, where innovation increasingly requires multidisciplinary 
teams, innovating alone is no longer possible. The most ‘important’ scientists should thus occupy 
the most central positions within the co-authorship networks. Betweenness centrality acts as a 
proxy for a researcher’ importance as an intermediary in our impact regressions. We show that 
better intermediaries have a better scientific performance. In addition, the structure of research 
teams, measured by the cliquishness, or clustering coefficient, also has an influence on scientific 
output. The maximum cliquishness, however, does not bring as much productivity benefits as we 
would expect, the relationship between cliquishness and scientific production exhibiting 
diminishing returns. In other words, one’s efforts in integrating team members into a more 
cliquish network may not be fully rewarded. Some level of fragmentation in the immediate 
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surrounding network of a scientist is therefore acceptable. To our knowledge, this is quite a 
novel result which raises some interesting questions regarding the optimal size and diversity of 
teams, compared with the amount of effort, expense and coordination that is required for the 
management of such teams. For a number of years now, Canada has promoted networking and 
multidiciplinarity via its granting councils, it is now time to pause and to measure the impacts of 
such policies in terms of scientific output and technology as excessive networking may not be as 
beneficial as one would have thought. 
There are a number of limitations to our research. First, we have examined a rather narrow field, 
nanotechnology. In order to fully support the claims of two of the ‘big 5’ universities in Quebec, 
for instance, one would have to assess all the disciplines in which both universities specialize. A 
second limitation concerns the mobility of scientists. Once a scientist moves out of the province, 
he disappears from our funding radar even though he may remain active. A third limitation of 
our study is the data. Although we have tried to extract as much of the articles of the researchers 
identified in the nanotechnology fields, it is possible that some escaped our net. Scopus does not 
include all scientific journals and as more journals are added every year, the coverage changes 
constantly, adding a time bias to the analysis. A fourth limitation stems from the fact that our 
model cannot measure the impact of graduate students on the production of a research group, 
because they are not academic professors employed at a university, they appear to have no 
funding. Finally, we have not yet been able to explicitly take into account research teams apart 
from those measured by co-publications.  
This last limitation exemplifies an important knowledge gap on research teams. and raises a 
number of interesting questions regarding the organization of research between localized and 
delocalized teams, and how public funding contributes to the constitution of these teams, 
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especially in light of the new ‘networking’ policies. Is more knowledge generated as a 
consequence of these policies? Similarly, we need a more comprehensive examination of 
whether private funding and the interaction with industry modify the composition of these 
research teams. Thursby and Thursby (2011), for instance, have made an interesting contribution 
regarding various interactions with industry and their impact. In other words, we need to evaluate 
whether the changes imposed on researchers by grant awarding bodies are a step in the right 
direction. 
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Appendix A – Model specifications 
Our dependent variable [nbArticle] being a count measure for each individual scientist over the 
years, a Poisson regression is generally appropriate for this purpose (Hausman et al., 1984) 
Pr Yit = yit( ) = exp! xit( ) !
! xit( )
yit !
"
#
$
%
&
' . 
The model expresses the probability of the number of occurrence of the observed value yit , i.e. 
the number of articles, depending on the parameter λ that is a function of the explanatory 
variables xit . This model implies the strong assumption that the variance of the number of 
occurrences is equal to the expected number of occurrences Var Yit[ ] = E Yit[ ] . This assumption 
further implies that there is no over-dispersion (when the variance exceeds the mean) in the 
sample. This over-dispersion causes for the standard errors to be underestimated, and hence for 
the significance of the coefficients to be overestimated. The negative binomial model is a 
solution to this over-dispersion, in which the parameter λ is expressed as ! = exp " xit( )# , where 
the error ε follows a Gamma distribution. This leads to write the variance as 
Var Yit[ ] = E Yit[ ] 1+!E Yit[ ]( ) , where α is the parameter of the Gamma distribution.  
In order to account for endogeneity within the negative binomial regression model, we use the 
Two-Stage Residual Inclusion (2SRI) method proposed by Terza et al. (2008). The main 
assumption of the model is that the conditional mean of the dependent variable can be written as 
(from Terza et al., 2008) E yi xin, xix, xiu!" #$ = M xin!n + xix!x + xiu!u( ) , where M !( )  is a non linear 
function, xin  is a vector of endogenous variables (in our case, there is only one), xix  is a vector 
of exogenous variables, and xiu  is a vector of unobservable latent variables (omitted variables) 
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that has an effect on the dependent variable and is correlated with the endogenous variable. The 
corresponding regression model can be written as yi = M xin!n + xix!x + xiu!u( )+ ui , where ui is 
the error term. 
The first regression (called auxiliary regression) therefore consists in modelling the relationship 
between the endogenous variable and the unobserved latent variables using a set of instrumental 
variables (IV), wi , that can be written as follows (in this case, we consider a linear relationship): 
xin = wi! + xiu  Eq. (A.1) 
where wi = xin w+!" #$  and w+ is the vector of instrumental variables and α is the vector of 
parameters. These variable have to meet the three following conditions: first, the instrumental 
variables must not be correlated with the unobserved variables E xu wi!" #$ = 0 ; second, the 
instrumental variables must be sufficiently correlated with the endogenous variable, which 
means that the instrumental variables would be sufficient to estimate the endogenous variable; 
and third, they are not correlated with the main variable of interest, nor with the error term. 
The first stage consists in estimating the auxiliary regression by ordinary least squares (OLS) and 
calculating the predicted values, xˆin = wi!ˆ , where !ˆ  is the estimate of α for the first equation 
(auxiliary regression). Subsequently, the residuals of the unobserved variables are calculated by 
xiu = xin ! xˆin . 
The second stage then consists in estimating the negative binomial regression model by 
introducing the residues as an explanatory variable. In the case of panel data, the error term 
contains both ui and a time related error component eit.  
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yit = M xint!n + xixt!x + xiut!u( )+ ui + eit  Eq. (A.2) 
 
Appendix B – Descriptive statistics 
Insert Table B.1 approximately here 
Insert Table B.2 approximately here 
 
Appendix C – Additional regression results 
Insert Table C.1 approximately here 
Insert Table C.2 approximately here 
 Fig. 1 –  Average number of articles per academic published per year 
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 Fig. 2 –  Average amount of public funds received per academic (in constant Canadian dollars of 2002) per year 
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 Fig. 3 –  Average amount of public (operating costs grants and infrastructure grants) and private (contracts) funds received (in constant Canadian 
dollars of 2002) per scientist for the period 1996-2005 
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 Fig. 4 –  Average betweenness centrality (Btwness3 x 104) and cliquishness (Cliqness3 x 104) per year 
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 Fig. 5 –  Index (relative to the maximum value over the years) of the number of articles and patents by the nanotechnology ‘career’ age of scientists 
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Table 1 – Negative binomial regression results – number of articles per academic per year 
Model Panel X-section  Panel Two-Stage Residual Inclusion (2SRI) X-section 2SRI  
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Average amount of grants over the past 3 years 
ln(AveGrant3t-1)  -0.0628 *** -0.0877 *** 0.0458 *** 0.0498 *** 0.0438 *** -0.0201 
 
-0.0322 
 
-0.0302 
 
0.2257 *** 0.1331 *** 
  (0.0141) 
 
(0.0189) 
 
(0.0183) 
 
(0.0180) 
 
(0.0180) 
 
(0.0252) 
 
(0.0251) 
 
(0.0251) 
 
(0.0339)  (0.0386) 
 [ln(AveGrant3t-1)]2 0.0052 *** 0.0081 *** 
      
0.0049 *** 0.0049 *** 0.0048 ***   0.0058 *** 
  (0.0011) 
 
(0.0016) 
       
(0.0011) 
 
(0.0011) 
 
(0.0011) 
 
  (0.0015) 
 Average amount of contracts over the past 3 years 
ln(AveCont3t-1)  -0.0100 
 
-0.0047 
 
0.0038 
 
0.0046 
 
0.0053 
 
-0.0112 
 
-0.0110 
 
-0.0135 
 
-0.0137 *** -0.0251 
   (0.0136) 
 
(0.0188) 
 
(0.0035) 
 
(0.0035) 
 
(0.0036) 
 
(0.0137) 
 
(0.0136) 
 
(0.0137) 
 
(0.0057)  (0.0182) 
 [ln(AveCont3t-1)]2 0.0015 
 
0.0010 
       
0.0013 
 
0.0016 
 
0.0016 
 
  0.0008 
   (0.0013) 
 
(0.0018) 
       
(0.0013) 
 
(0.0013) 
 
(0.0013) 
 
  (0.0017) 
 Number of patent applications of the past 3 years 
nbPatent3t-1 0.0777 *** 0.0902 *** 0.0177 *** -0.0034 
 
0.0500 *** 0.0669 *** 0.0579 *** 0.0800 *** 0.0518 *** 0.0960 *** 
  (0.0136) 
 
(0.0210) 
 
(0.0044) 
 
(0.0049) 
 
(0.0084) 
 
(0.0110) 
 
(0.0116) 
 
(0.0136) 
 
(0.0132)  (0.0194) 
 [nbPatent3t-1]2 -0.0012 ** -0.0020 ** 
      
-0.0015 *** -0.0006 
 
-0.0013 **   -0.0023 *** 
  (0.0005) 
 
(0.0008) 
       
(0.0002) 
 
(0.0005) 
 
(0.0005) 
 
  (0.0007) 
 3-year network betweenness centrality 
Btwness3t-2 x104 0.0426 *** 0.1238 *** 
  
0.0101 *** 0.0395 *** 0.0111 *** 0.0412 *** 0.0414 *** 0.0871 *** 0.0993 *** 
  (0.0067) 
 
(0.01474) 
   
(0.0011) 
 
(0.0067) 
 
(0.0011) 
 
(0.0068) 
 
(0.0067) 
 
(0.0180)  (0.0147) 
 3-year network cliquishness 
ln(Cliqness3t-2x104) 0.0687 ** 0.2075 *** -0.0045 * -0.0049 ** -0.0043 * 0.0479 
 
0.0764 ** 0.0701 ** -0.0207 *** 0.2360 *** 
  (0.0309) 
 
(0.0450) 
 
(0.0025) 
 
(0.0025) 
 
(0.0025) 
 
(0.0300) 
 
(0.0309) 
 
(0.0309) 
 
(0.0024)  (0.0438) 
 [ln(Cliqness3t-2x104)]2 -0.0025 ** -0.0075 *** 
      
-0.0018 * -0.0027 *** -0.0025 **   -0.0084 *** 
  (0.0010) 
 
(0.0015) 
       
(0.0010) 
 
(0.0010) 
 
(0.0010) 
 
  (0.0015) 
 Nanotechnology ‘career’ age of an academic 
Aget 0.0895 *** 0.0504 ** 0.0312 *** 0.0243 *** 0.0204 ** 0.0689 *** 0.0724 *** 0.0710 *** -0.0207 *** -0.0277 
   (0.0160) 
 
(0.0184) 
 
(0.0071) 
 
(0.0068) 
 
(0.0066) 
 
(0.0198) 
 
(0.0198) 
 
(0.0197) 
 
(0.0074)  (0.0230) 
 Aget2 -0.0027 *** -0.0018 ** 
      
-0.0020 *** -0.0022 *** -0.0021 ***   0.0002 
   (0.0006) 
 
(0.0007) 
       
(0.0007) 
 
(0.0007) 
 
(0.0007) 
 
  (0.0008) 
 Interaction variables  
(Btwness3t-2 x104) x 
  ln(Cliqness3t-2)  
-0.0048 *** -0.0155 *** 
    
-0.0042 *** 
  
-0.0046 *** -0.0042 *** -0.0086 ** -0.0113 *** 
(0.0010) 
 
(0.0024) 
     
(0.0010) 
   
(0.0011) 
 
(0.0011) 
 
(0.0031)  (0.0025) 
 (Btwness3t-2 x104) x  
  ln(AveCont3t-1)  
0.0002 
 
0.0009 ** 
    
-0.0001 
   
-0.0002 
 
0.0001 
 
0.0004  0.0006 
 (0.0002) 
 
(0.0004) 
     
(0.0001) 
   
(0.0002) 
 
(0.0002) 
 
(0.0006)  (0.0004) 
 (Btwness3t-2 x104) x  
  nbPatent3t-1 
-0.0017 *** -0.0036 *** 
    
-0.0005 *** 
  
-0.0002 
 
-0.0018 *** -0.0009 *** -0.0039 *** 
(0.0005) 
 
(0.0007) 
     
(0.0001) 
   
(0.0001) 
 
(0.0005) 
 
(0.0001)  (0.0007) 
 
Table
Model Panel X-section  Panel Two-Stage Residual Inclusion (2SRI) X-section 2SRI  
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
(Btwness3t-2 x104) x  
  [nbPatent3t-1]2  
2.6E-05 *** 6.0E-05 *** 
          
2.8E-05 ***   6.4E-05 *** 
(0.9E-05) 
 
(1.3E-05) 
           
(0.9E-05) 
 
  (1.3E-05) 
 Universities dummy variables a 
dULaval -0.2159 *** -0.0831 * -0.3256 *** -0.2949 *** -0.2565 *** -0.2707 *** -0.2391 *** -0.2359 *** -0.2441 *** -0.2130 *** 
  (0.0633) 
 
(0.0578) 
 
(0.0729) 
 
(0.0682) 
 
(0.0658) 
 
(0.0659) 
 
(0.6046) 
 
(0.0642) 
 
(0.0621)  (0.0586) 
 dUMontrealG -0.2370 *** -0.1055 ** -0.3458 *** -0.2922 *** -0.2653 *** -0.2798 *** -0.2488 *** -0.2491 *** -0.2269 *** -0.2091 *** 
  (0.0599) 
 
(0.0542) 
 
(0.0677) 
 
(0.0637) 
 
(0.0615) 
 
(0.0616) 
 
(0.0604) 
 
(0.0601) 
 
(0.0578)  (0.0547) 
 dUConcordia -0.1412 ** -0.1482 * -0.0831 
 
-0.1561 
 
-0.1301 
 
-0.1372 
 
-0.1086 
 
-0.1113 
 
-0.0101  -0.0247 
  (0.1198) 
 
(0.1340) 
 
(0.1401) 
 
(0.1294) 
 
(0.1241) 
 
(0.1254) 
 
(0.1218) 
 
(0.1214) 
 
(0.1269)  (0.1329) 
 dUSherbrookeG -0.3182 *** -0.1656 *** -0.4686 *** -0.4077 *** -0.3626 *** -0.3579 *** -0.3225 *** -0.3224 *** -0.2947 *** -0.2391 *** 
  (0.0831) 
 
(0.0702) 
 
(0.0934) 
 
(0.0880) 
 
(0.0849) 
 
(0.0855) 
 
(0.0836) 
 
(0.0833) 
 
(0.0742)  (0.0725) 
 dUQuebecG -0.3288 *** -0.1538 ** -0.4452 *** -0.3854 *** -0.3505 *** -0.3486 *** -0.3207 *** -0.3197 *** -0.1571 ** -0.1227 * 
  (0.0728) 
 
(0.0749) 
 
(0.0816) 
 
(0.0768) 
 
(0.0740) 
 
(0.0748) 
 
(0.0732) 
 
(0.0729) 
 
(0.0715)  (0.0676) 
 
 
                                      
Residuals from 1st stage     -0.0472 ** -0.0516 *** -0.0448 ** -0.0412 ** -0.0287  -0.0302  -0.2202 *** -0.2017 *** 
     (0.0190)  (0.0186)  (0.0186)  (0.0192)  (0.0193)  (0.0193)  (0.0346)  (0.0322)  
Constant 1.3496 *** -0.2356 ** 1.7311 *** 1.6179 *** 1.6283 *** 1.3036 *** 1.1949 *** 1.2101 *** -0.8956 *** -1.6558 *** 
  (0.1946) 
 
(0.2295) 
 
(0.1733) 
 
(0.1709) 
 
(0.1694) 
 
(0.2137) 
 
(0.2151) 
 
(0.2148) 
 
(0.2809)  (0.3344) 
 Years Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  Yes   
 
                                      
ln(r) 2.6894 *** 
 
  2.3980 *** 2.5312 *** 2.6269 *** 2.6322 *** 2.6837 *** 2.6977 ***   
    (0.0837) 
  
  (0.0796) 
 
(0.0812) 
 
(0.0824) 
 
(0.0830) 
 
(0.0837) 
 
(0.0840) 
 
  
  ln(s) 1.5361 *** 
 
  1.1760 *** 1.3565 *** 1.4713 *** 1.4539 *** 1.5327 *** 1.5466 ***   
    (0.0799) 
  
  (0.0660) 
 
(0.0725) 
 
(0.0766) 
 
(0.0764) 
 
(0.0800) 
 
(0.0805) 
 
  
  ln(alpha)   
 
-0.9424 ***   
          
  -0.9329 *** -1.0043 *** 
    
 
(0.0563) 
 
  
          
  (0.0521)  (0.0536) 
 Nb observations 5739 
 
5739   5724 
 
5724
 
5724
 
5724
 
5724
 
5724  5724  5724 
 Nb academics 907 
 
907   907 
 
907 
 
907 
 
907 
 
907 
 
907  907  907 
 Average nb years 6.33  6.33  6.31  6.31  6.31  6.31  6.31  6.31  6.31  6.31  
Log likelihood -11011.2 
 
-11403.2   -11679.5 
 
-11040.6 
 
-11006.8 
 
-10994.9 
 
-10983.3 
 
-10978.3 
 
-11384.3  -11314.1 
 Wald χ2 448.85 *** 4985.98  *** 212.25 *** 309.50 *** 390.95 *** 411.84 *** 441.42 *** 455.20 *** 739.13 *** 5651.01 *** 
Notes: ***, **, * show significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 Standard errors are presented in parentheses 
 a McGill University is the omitted dummy variable 
 
Table 2 – Negative binomial regression results – number of articles per academic per year (distinguishing operating cost and infrastructure grants) 
Model Panel X-section  Panel Two-Stage Residual Inclusion (2SRI) X-section 2SRI  
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Average amount of operating costs grants over the past 3 years 
ln(AveGrantO3t-1)  -0.0714 *** -0.1004 *** 0.0599 *** 0.0633 *** 0.0451 *** -0.0147 
 
-0.0343 
 
-0.0331   0.1550 *** 0.0543 * 
  (0.0154)  (0.0201)  (0.0149) 
 
(0.0147) 
 
(0.0135) 
 
(0.0246) 
 
(0.0231) 
 
(0.0231)   (0.0231)  (0.0319) 
 [ln(AveGrantO3t-1)]2 0.0061 *** 0.0094 ***   
     
0.0052 *** 0.0055 *** 0.0055 ***   0.0064 *** 
  (0.0013)  (0.0017)    
     
(0.0013) 
 
(0.0013) 
 
(0.0013)     (0.0017) 
 Average amount of contracts over the past 3 years 
ln(AveCont3t-1)  -0.0090  -0.0031  0.0020  0.0029  0.0052  -0.0107  -0.0105  -0.0132   -0.0042  -0.0173  
  (0.0136)  (0.0186)  (0.0034)  (0.0033)  (0.0034)  (0.0136)  (0.0136)  (0.0136)   (0.0051)  (0.0181)  
[ln(AveCont3t-1)]2 0.0014  0.0008         0.0011  0.0015  0.0015     0.0009  
  (0.0013)  (0.0018)         (0.0013)  (0.0013)  (0.0013)     (0.0017)  
Number of patent applications of the past 3 years 
nbPatent3t-1 0.0789 *** 0.0913 *** 0.0174 *** -0.0039  0.0511 *** 0.0696 *** 0.0602 *** 0.0842 *** 0.0535 *** 0.0998 *** 
  (0.0136)  (0.0208)  (0.0044)  (0.0049)  (0.0084)  (0.0110)  (0.0116)  (0.0137)   (0.0131)  (0.0195)  
[nbPatent3t-1]2 -0.0012 ** -0.0020 ***        -0.0016 *** -0.0007  -0.0014 **   -0.0024 *** 
  (0.0005)  (0.0008)         (0.0002)  (0.0005)  (0.0005)     (0.0008)  
3-year network betweenness centrality 
Btwness3t-2 x104 0.0424 *** 0.1231 ***   
 
0.0102 *** 0.0397 *** 0.0111 *** 0.0412 *** 0.0415 *** 0.0981 *** 0.1094 *** 
  (0.0067)  (0.0146)    
 
(0.0011) 
 
(0.0066) 
 
(0.0011) 
 
(0.0067) 
 
(0.0067)   (0.0177)  (0.0145) 
 3-year network cliquishness 
ln(Cliqness3t-2x104) 0.0703 ** 0.2080 *** -0.0044 * -0.0048 * -0.0042 * 0.0512 * 0.0789 ** 0.0722 ** -0.0140 *** 0.2254 *** 
  (0.0309)  (0.0449)  (0.0025)  (0.0025)  (0.0025)  (0.0300)  (0.0309)  (0.0309)   (0.0024)  (0.0448)  
[ln(Cliqness3t-2x104)]2 -0.0025 ** -0.0075 ***   
     
-0.0019 * -0.0028 *** -0.0026 **   -0.0080 *** 
  (0.0010)  (0.0015)    
     
(0.0010) 
 
(0.0010) 
 
(0.0010)     (0.0015) 
 Nanotechnology ‘career’ age of an academic 
Aget 0.0859 *** 0.0472 ** 0.0267 *** 0.0198 *** 0.0187 *** 0.0599 *** 0.0664 *** 0.0651 *** -0.0126 * -0.0060 
   (0.0160)  (0.0184)  (0.0069) 
 
(0.0067) 
 
(0.0064) 
 
(0.0188) 
 
(0.0183) 
 
(0.0183)   (0.0066)  (0.0206) 
 Aget2 -0.0026 *** -0.0018 **   
     
-0.0018 *** -0.0020 *** -0.0020 ***   -0.0004 
   (0.0006)  (0.0007)    
     
(0.0007) 
 
(0.0007) 
 
(0.0006)     (0.0008) 
 Interaction variables 
(Btwness3t-2x104) x 
  ln(Cliqness3t-2x104)  
-0.0047 *** -0.0154 ***     -0.0042 ***   
-0.0046 *** -0.0045 *** -0.0105 *** -0.0131 *** 
(0.0010)  (0.0024)      (0.0010)    
(0.0010) 
 
(0.0010)   (0.0030)  (0.0024) 
 (Btwness3t-2x104) x  
  ln(AveCont3t-1) 
0.0002  0.0009 **     -0.0001    
-0.0002 
 
0.0002   0.0005  0.0007 * 
(0.0002)  (0.0004)      (0.0001)    
(0.0002) 
 
(0.0002)   (0.0006)  (0.0004) 
 (Btwness3t-2x104) x  
  nbPatent3t-1  
-0.0017 *** -0.0036 ***     -0.0005 ***   
-0.0002 * -0.0019 *** -0.0009 *** -0.0039 *** 
(0.0005)  (0.0007)      (0.0001)    
(0.0001) 
 
(0.0005)   (0.0001)  (0.0007) 
 
Table
Model Panel X-section  Panel Two-Stage Residual Inclusion (2SRI) X-section 2SRI  
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
(Btwness3t-2x104) x  
  [nbPatent3t-1]2 
2.7E-05 *** 6.0E-05 ***           
3.0E-05 ***   6.5E-05 *** 
(0.9E-05)  (1.3E-05)            
(0.9E-05)     (1.3E-05) 
 Universities dummy variables a 
dULaval -0.2125 *** -0.0769  -0.3303 *** -0.2984 *** -0.2534 *** -0.2702 *** -0.2364 *** -0.2325 *** -0.1854 *** -0.1522 *** 
  (0.0632)  (0.0575)  (0.0722) 
 
(0.0676) 
 
(0.0652) 
 
(0.0655) 
 
(0.0639) 
 
(0.0636)   (0.0609)  (0.0578) 
 dUMontrealG -0.2311 *** -0.0956 * -0.3406 *** -0.2868 *** -0.2573 *** -0.2714 *** -0.2396 *** -0.2393 *** -0.1779 *** -0.1546 *** 
  (0.0597)  (0.0542)  (0.0674) 
 
(0.0634) 
 
(0.0613) 
 
(0.0614) 
 
(0.0601) 
 
(0.0598)   (0.0562)  (0.0533) 
 dUConcordia -0.1302  -0.1282  -0.0654 
 
-0.1391 
 
-0.1279 
 
-0.1252 
 
-0.0979 
 
-0.1010   -0.0742  -0.0311 
   (0.1196)  (0.1337)  (0.1389) 
 
(0.1282) 
 
(0.1231) 
 
(0.1243) 
 
(0.1207) 
 
(0.1203)   (0.1264)  (0.1335) 
 dUSherbrokkeG -0.3078 *** -0.1531 ** -0.4759 *** -0.4139 *** -0.3633 *** -0.3560 *** -0.3166 *** -0.3156 *** -0.2617 *** -0.1997 *** 
  (0.0830)  (0.0705)  (0.0933) 
 
(0.0879) 
 
(0.0849) 
 
(0.0856) 
 
(0.0837) 
 
(0.0833)   (0.0715)  (0.0706) 
 dUQuebecG -0.3186 *** -0.1396 * -0.4336 *** -0.3735 *** -0.3456 *** -0.3383 *** -0.3104 *** -0.3091 *** -0.1637 * -0.1246 * 
  (0.0728)  (0.0748)  (0.0813) 
 
(0.0765) 
 
(0.0739) 
 
(0.0747) 
 
(0.0732) 
 
(0.0728)   (0.0740)  (0.0704) 
 
 Residuals from 1st stage     -0.0623 *** -0.0663 *** -0.0466 *** -0.0491 *** -0.0325 ** -0.0336 ** -0.1506 *** -0.1586 *** 
     (0.0155)  (0.0153)  (0.0142)  (0.0160)  (0.0149)  (0.0148)  (0.0237)  (0.0239)  
Constant 1.3428 *** -0.2252  1.6480 *** 1.5411 *** 1.6318 *** 1.2716 *** 1.1813 *** 1.2011 *** -0.3025  -1.0866 *** 
  (0.1941)  (0.2275)  (0.1536) 
 
(0.1516) 
 
(0.1452) 
 
(0.2054) 
 
(0.2056) 
 
(0.2054)   (0.1969)  (0.2863) 
 Years Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes  Yes    
 ln(r) 2.6922 ***    2.4052 *** 2.5413 *** 2.6318 *** 2.6376 *** 2.6888 *** 2.7039 ***       (0.0837)     (0.0797)  
(0.0814) 
 
(0.0826) 
 
(0.0831) 
 
(0.0838) 
 
(0.0842)       ln(s) 1.5479 ***    1.1839 *** 1.3658 *** 1.4730 *** 1.4617 *** 1.5400 *** 1.5548 ***       (0.0803)     (0.0661)  
(0.0726) 
 
(0.0765) 
 
(0.0765) 
 
(0.0802) 
 
(0.0807)       ln(alpha)    -0.9475 ***             
  -0.9196 *** -0.9895 *** 
     (0.0566)              
  (0.0533)  (0.0543) 
 Nb observations 5741  5741   5710  5710  5710  5710  5710  5710  5710  5710  
Nb academics 907  907   906  906  906  906  906  906  906  906  
Average nb years 6.33  6.33   6.30  6.30  6.30  6.30  6.30  6.30  6.30  6.30  
Log likelihood -11012.1  -11401.1   -11043.6 
 
-11007.8 
 
-10976.1 
 
-10963.4 
 
-10952.7 
 
-10947.1   -11367.5  -11297.9 
 Wald χ2 450.75 *** 5036.74 *** 221.99 *** 397.00 *** 419.87 *** 447.60 *** 447.60 *** 463.05 *** 727.03 *** 5477.35 *** 
Notes: ***, **, * show significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 Standard errors are presented in parentheses 
 a McGill University is the omitted dummy variable 
 
Table B.1 – Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
nbArticlet 5896 2.6109 2.9233 0 32 
nbPatent3t 5896 0.4220 1.7908 0 54 
Grantt 5896 $260,279 $1,024,648 0 $41,900,000 
GrantOt 5896 $184,347 $328,426 $84 $6,738,504 
GrantIt 5896 $75,932 $910,158 0 $41,600,000 
Contt 5896 $45,809 $392,464 0 $12,100,000 
AveGrant3t 5896 $233,503 $707,174 0 $15,900,000 
AveGrantO3t 5896 $166,769 $292,962 $91 $5,180,839 
AveGrantI3t 5896 $66,735 $553,134 0 $15,200,000 
AveCont3t 5896 $43,942 $367,643 0 $11,600,000 
ln(AveGrant3t) 5894 11.4137 1.3499 4.5248 16.5820 
ln(AveGrantO3t) 5896 11.2812 1.2808 4.5248 15.4605 
ln(AveGrantI3t) 5880 3.4135 4.9186 0 16.5350 
ln(AveCont3t) 5891 3.9198 5.0198 0 16.2668 
Btwness3t 5896 3.662E-04 9.058E-04 0 2.022E-02 
Cliqness3t 5896 0.0157 0.0472 0 0.7243 
codeChair 5896 0.6530 0.8845 0 3 
Aget 5896 12.7473 4.3708 1 21 
 
 
Table
Table B.2 – Correlation matrix 
Variable  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
nbArticlet 1 1     
     
 
AveArticle3t-2 2 0.6283 1     
nbPatent3t-1 3 0.1361 0.2340 1   
     
 
ln(AveGrant3t-1) 4 0.0898 0.1499 0.0560 1  
     
 
ln(AveGrantO3t-1) 5 0.0937 0.1550 0.0562 0.9842 1 
     
 
ln(AveGrantI3t-1) 6 0.0513 0.0201 0.0554 0.3478 0.2743 1
    
 
ln(AveCont3t-1) 7 0.0893 0.0890 0.1103 0.2712 0.2701 0.1553 1
   
 
Btwness3t-2x104 8 0.4905 0.7283 0.3123 0.0219 0.0280 -0.0261 0.0109 1
  
 
ln(Cliqness3 t-2x104) 9 -0.1052 -0.2421 -0.0232 -0.0550 -0.0565 -0.0154 -0.0181 -0.0809 1
 
 
codeChair 10 0.0436 0.0570 -0.0043 0.1735 0.1749 0.1346 0.1178 0.0158 -0.0155 1  
Aget 11 0.1450 0.2598 0.0611 0.3053 0.3140 0.0696 0.1366 0.0937 -0.0756 0.0930 1 
 
Table
 Table C.1 – First stage regressions results – average amount of grant funding received over three years per academic per year 
 Panel Two-Stage Residual Inclusion (2SRI) X-section 2SRI 
Variables (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Instruments 
Average number of articles published per year in the past 3-5 years 
AveArticle3t-2  0.0479 ** 0.0740 ** 0.0572 * 0.0698 ** 0.0491  0.0497  0.1497 *** 0.1673 *** 
  (0.0243)  (0.0309)  (0.0327)  (0.0310)  (0.0330)  (0.0330)  (0.0310)  (0.0308)  
Ordinal variable of the ‘best’ Chair occupied by an academic 
codeChair 0.5703 *** 0.5683 *** 0.5675 *** 0.5712 *** 0.5714 *** 0.5710 *** 0.3970 *** 0.3935 *** 
  (0.0952)  (0.0947)  (0.0947)  (0.0945)  (0.0946)  (0.0947)  (0.0539)  (0.0539)  
Average amount of grants received by nanotechnology colleagues at the same university of an academic over the past 3 years 
ln(AveGrant3Ut-1) 1.7939 *** 1.7866 *** 1.7769 *** 1.7172 *** 1.7110 *** 1.7101 *** 1.4855 *** 1.4674 *** 
 (0.1124)  (0.1125)  (0.1125)  (0.1121)  (0.1121)  (0.1121)  (0.1758)  (0.1741)  
Variables from the second stage equation 
ln(AveCont3t-1)  0.0975 *** 0.0971 *** 0.0942 *** 0.0896 ** 0.0904 ** 0.0921 ** 0.1152 *** 0.0967 *** 
  (0.0096)  (0.0096)  (0.0102)  (0.0449)  (0.0449)  (0.0450)  (0.0093)  (0.0408)  
[ln(AveCont3t-1)]2       0.0004  -0.0001  -0.0001    0.0016          (0.0042)  (0.0043)  (0.0043)    (0.0038)  nbPatent3t-1 0.0318  0.0394  0.0095  -0.0094  -0.0103  -0.0246  -0.0014  -0.0270  
  (0.0236)  (0.0243)  (0.0328)  (0.0422)  (0.0456)  (0.0509)  (0.0260)  (0.0487)  
[nbPatent3t-1]2       0.0013  0.0010  0.0014    0.0014          (0.0010)  (0.0020)  (0.0021)    (0.0016)  Btwness3t-2x104   -0.0093  0.0324  -0.0152 ** 0.0315  0.0314  0.0220  0.0003      (0.0069)  (0.0353)  (0.0071)  (0.0358)  (0.0358)  (0.0380)  (0.0384)  ln(Cliqness3t-2x104) 0.0015  0.0024  0.0021  -0.0525  -0.0274  -0.0235  -0.0002  -0.2591 ** 
  (0.0064)  (0.0064)  (0.0064)  (0.0909)  (0.0934)  (0.0936)  (0.0071)  (0.1051)  
[ln(Cliqness3t-2x104)]2       0.0019  0.0010  0.0009    0.0087 **         (0.0031)  (0.0031)  (0.0032)    (0.0036)  Aget 0.1775 *** 0.1769 *** 0.1776 *** 0.5630 *** 0.5656 *** 0.5658 *** 0.1351 *** 0.3668 *** 
  (0.0204)  (0.0203)  (0.0204)  (0.0494)  (0.0494)  (0.0494)  (0.0143)  (0.0662)  
Aget2       -0.0162 *** -0.0164 *** -0.0164 ***   -0.0094 ***         (0.0019)  (0.0019)  (0.0019)    (0.0025)  Interaction variables 
(Btwness3t-2x104) x 
  ln(Cliqness3t-2x104)  
    -0.0072    -0.0078  -0.0079  -0.0084  -0.0048  
    (0.0054)    (0.0055)  (0.0055)  (0.0060)  (0.0061)  
Table
 Panel Two-Stage Residual Inclusion (2SRI) X-section 2SRI 
Variables (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
(Btwness3t-2x104) x  
  ln(AveCont3t-1) 
    0.0010    0.0012  0.0009  0.0006  0.0005  
    (0.0008)    (0.0008)  (0.0009)  (0.0006)  (0.0008)  (Btwness3t-2x104) x  
  nbPatent3t-1  
    0.0004    0.0001  0.0016  0.0007 *** 0.0020  
    (0.0003)    (0.0006)  (0.0025)  (0.0002)  (0.0023)  (Btwness3t-2x104) x  
  [nbPatent3t-1]2 
          -2.8E-05    -3.2E-05  
          (4.4E-05)    (4.0E-05)  Universities dummy variables a 
dULaval -0.1296  -0.1264  -0.1159  -0.1534  -0.1403  -0.1418  0.0303  0.0370  
  (0.2501)  (0.2488)  (0.2491)  (0.2483)  (0.2489)  (0.2490)  (0.1517)  (0.1520)  
dUMontrealG -0.2151  -0.2196  -0.2041  -0.2148  -0.2027  -0.2018  0.0306  0.0590  
  (0.23433)  (0.2331)  (0.2334)  (0.2328)  (0.2333)  (0.2334)  (0.1453)  (0.1471)  
dUConcordia 0.4084  0.4377  0.4667  0.3722  0.3961  0.3858  0.4566  0.4597  
  (0.4494)  (0.4479)  (0.4482)  (0.4469)  (0.4475)  (0.4477)  (0.3967)  (0.3951)  
dUSherbrookeG 0.2543  0.2542  0.2579  0.2254  0.2346  0.2340  0.3183 * 0.3241 * 
  (0.3205)  (0.3188)  (0.3190)  (0.3182)  (0.3182)  (0.3189)  (0.1764)  (0.1783)  
dUQuebecG -0.1840  -0.1890  -0.1784  -0.2777  -0.2664  -0.2663  -0.1812  -0.1842  
  (0.2780)  (0.2766)  (0.2770)  (0.2764)  (0.2770)  (0.2771)  (0.1727)  (0.1731)  
 
Constant -13.1000 *** -13.0000 *** -12.9000 *** -14.1000 *** -14.1000 *** -14.2000 *** -8.6258 *** -8.5984 *** 
  (1.2675)  (1.2684)  (1.2695)  (1.3342)  (1.3360)  (1.3360)  (1.9557)  (1.9991)  
Years yes    yes    yes    yes    yes    yes    yes  yes    
 
Nb observations 5724  5724  5724  5724  5724  5724  5724  5724  
Nb academics 907  907  907  907  907  907  907  907  
Average nb years 6.31  6.31  6.31  6.31  6.31  6.31   6.31  6.31  
F               80.61 *** 364.11 *** 
Wald χ2 2127.23 *** 2127.69 *** 2133,52 *** 2235.94 *** 2241.37 *** 2241.67 ***     R2 overall 0.2522  0.2537  0.2547  0.2557  0.2562  0.2563  0.2627  0.2674  
R2 within groups 0.2926  0.2921  0.2926  0.3060  0.3067  0.3067      
R2 between groups 0.1301  0.1343  0.1355  0.1251  0.1247  0.1250      
Notes: ***, **, * show significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 Standard errors are presented in parentheses 
 a McGill University is the omitted university  
 
Table C.2 – First stage regressions results – average amount of operating costs funding received over three years per academic per year 
 Panel Two-Stage Residual Inclusion (2SRI) X-section 2SRI 
Variables (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  
Instruments 
Average number of articles published per year in the past 3-5 years 
AveArticle3t-2  0.0440 * 0.0644 ** 0.0504  0.0647 ** 0.0458  0.0465   0.1405 *** 0.1580 *** 
  (0.0237)  (0.0302)  (0.0318)  (0.0303)  (0.0321)  (0.0321)   (0.0287)  (0.0289)  
Ordinal variable of the ‘best’ Chair occupied by an academic 
codeChair 0.4886 *** 0.4871 *** 0.4785 *** 0.4899 *** 0.4829 *** 0.4825 *** 0.3305 *** 0.3272 *** 
  (0.0916)  (0.0913)  (0.0915)  (0.0912)  (0.0915)  (0.0915)   (0.0522)  (0.0516)  
Average amount of grants received by nanotechnology colleagues at the same university of an academic over the past 3 years 
ln(AveGrant3Ut-1) 1.6484 *** 1.6425 *** 1.6279 *** 1.5746 *** 1.5631 *** 1.5621 *** 1.2934 *** 1.2737 *** 
 (0.1104)  (0.1105)  (0.1097)  (0.1100)  (0.1093)  (0.1093)   (0.1709)  (0.1694)  
Variables from the second stage equation 
ln(AveGrantI3t-1)  0.1164 *** 0.1162 *** 0.1804 *** 0.1948 *** 0.1912 *** 0.1905 ***   -0.0030  
  (0.0089)  (0.0089)  (0.0111)  (0.0395)  (0.0393)  (0.0393)     (0.0026)  
[ln(AveGrantI3t-1)]2        -0.0073 ** -0.0013  -0.0013   0.1636 *** 0.1959 *** 
         (0.0036)  (0.0036)  (0.0036)   (0.0107)  (0.0295)  
ln(AveCont3t-1)  0.0910 *** 0.0907 *** 0.1362 *** 0.0723  0.1065 ** 0.1083 ** 0.1356 *** 0.0947 ** 
  (0.0094)  (0.0094)  (0.0112)  (0.0440)  (0.0439)  (0.0440)   (0.0109)  (0.0372)  
[ln(AveCont3t-1)]2        0.0016  0.0022  0.0022     0.0038  
         (0.0041)  (0.0041)  (0.0041)     (0.0035)  
nbPatent3t-1 0.0359  0.0419 * 0.0030  -0.0411  -0.0333  -0.0483   -0.0193  -0.0771  
  (0.0232)  (0.0238)  (0.0320)  (0.0414)  (0.0445)  (0.0497)   (0.0280)  (0.0480)  
[nbPatent3t-1]2        0.0022 ** 0.0019  0.0024     0.0033 ** 
         (0.0009)  (0.0019)  (0.0020)     (0.0017)  
Btwness3t-2x104    -0.0073  0.0282  -0.0147 ** 0.0234  0.0233   0.0057  -0.0124  
     (0.0068)  (0.0344)  (0.0070)  (0.0349)  (0.0349)   (0.0360)  (0.0369)  
ln(Cliqness3t-2x104) 0.0003  0.0010  -0.0010  -0.0912  -0.0999  -0.0959   -0.0026  -0.2374 ** 
  (0.0063)  (0.0063)  (0.0063)  (0.0891)  (0.0910)  (0.0912)   (0.0067)  (0.0979)  
[ln(Cliqness3t-2x104)]2        0.0031  0.0033  0.0032     0.0079 ** 
         (0.0030)  (0.0031)  (0.0031)     (0.0033)  
Aget 0.2107 *** 0.2102 *** 0.2151 *** 0.6137 *** 0.6051 *** 0.6053 *** 0.1643 *** 0.4125 *** 
  (0.0197)  (0.0196)  (0.0197)  (0.0484)  (0.0482)  (0.0482)   (0.0140)  (0.0639)  
Aget2        -0.0165 *** -0.0160 *** -0.0160 ***   -0.0101 *** 
         (0.0018)  (0.0018)  (0.0018)     (0.0024)  
Interaction variables 
Table
 Panel Two-Stage Residual Inclusion (2SRI) X-section 2SRI 
Variables (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  
(Btwness3t-2 x104) x 
  ln(Cliqness3t-2)  
    -0.0064 
   -0.0061  -0.0062   -0.0054  -0.0024  
    (0.0053) 
   (0.0054)  (0.0054)   (0.0057)  (0.0058)  
ln(AveGrantI3t-2) x  
  ln(AveCont3t-1)  
    -0.0142 
***   -0.0135 *** -0.0135 *** -0.0091 *** -0.0090 *** 
    (0.0015) 
   (0.0015)  (0.0015)   (0.0012)  (0.0013)  
(Btwness3t-2 x104) x  
  ln(AveCont3t-1)  
    0.0009 
   0.0011  0.0008   0.0005  0.0003  
    (0.0008) 
   (0.0008)  (0.0009)   (0.0006)  (0.0007)  
(Btwness3t-2 x104) x  
  nbPatent3t-1 
    0.0004 
   -0.0001  0.0015   0.0008 *** 0.0026  
    (0.0003) 
   (0.0006)  (0.0024)   (0.0002)  (0.0022)  
(Btwness3t-2 x104) x  
  [nbPatent3t-1]2  
     
     -2.9E-05     -4.8E-05  
     
     (4.3E-05)     (4.0E-05)  
Universitiy dummy variables a 
dULaval -0.3757  -0.3730  -0.3812  -0.4153 * -0.3994 * -0.4008 * -0.2601 * -0.2558 * 
  (0.2409)  (0.2400)  (0.2407)  (0.2399)  (0.2408)  (0.2408)   (0.1516)  (0.1526)  
dUMontrealG -0.4244 * -0.4276 * -0.4515 ** -0.4190 * -0.4418 * -0.4409 * -0.1840  -0.1484  
  (0.2256)  (0.2248)  (0.2254)  (0.2246)  (0.2254)  (0.2254)   (0.1458)  (0.1473)  
dUConcordia 0.3623  0.3848  0.4396  0.3293  0.3812  0.3810   0.2880  0.2903  
  (0.4332)  (0.4324)  (0.4328)  (0.4317)  (0.4323)  (0.4323)   (0.3588)  (0.3511)  
dUSherbrookeG -0.0698  -0.0700  -0.0761  -0.1224  -0.0973  -0.0978   -0.0874  -0.0831  
  (0.3086)  (0.3074)  (0.3082)  (0.3074)  (0.3084)  (0.3083)   (0.1716)  (0.1731)  
dUQuebecG -0.3518  -0.3559  -0.3867  -0.4541 * -0.4617 * -0.4616 * -0.4447 *** -0.4482 *** 
  (0.2673)  (0.2663)  (0.2672)  (0.2665)  (0.2674)  (0.2674)   (0.1562)  (0.1568)  
                               
Constant -11.8000 *** -11.7000 *** -11.7000 *** -12.7000 *** -12.6000 *** -12.6000 *** -6.8274 *** -6.9823 *** 
  (1.2449)  (1.2459)  (1.2375)  (1.3097)  (1.3030)  (1.3031)   (1.8960)  (1.9309)  
Years yes    yes    yes    yes    yes    yes    yes  yes    
                               
Nb observations 5710  5710  5710  5710  5710  5710  5710  5710  
Nb academics 906  906  906  906  906  906  906  906  
Average nb years 30  30  30  30  30  30   30  30  
F               95.27 *** 452.41 *** 
Wald c2 2308.71 *** 2308.92 *** 2443.96 *** 2442.29 *** 2560.28 *** 2560.46 ***     
R2 overall 0.2792  0.2802  0.2850  0.2848  0.2885  0.2886  0.2947  0.3003  
R2 within groups 0.3047  0.3062  0.3205  0.3216  0.3341  0.3341      
R2 between groups 0.1700  0.1737  0.1744  0.1668  0.1657  0.1661      
Notes: ***, **, * show significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Standard errors are presented in parentheses 
 a McGill University is the omitted university 
